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GLOBALIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF CHINA, INDIA, AND SOUTH 
KOREA: AN ARGUMENT FOR DIVERGENCE 
 
MOHAMMAD A. ALI 
University of Rhode Island 
 
Driven by technological advances, improved communications, economic liberalization, and 
increased international competition, globalization has brought in an era of economic, institutional 
and cultural integration. Under globalization the workplace practices are under a constant state of 
flux. Academics are not only analyzing the benefits and the deleterious effects of this 
phenomenon on the employment relations of developed and under-developed nations. They have 
also stirred up the old controversy regarding the longer-run trajectory of employment relations 
systems under the pressures of globalization. The debate is on the question that whether the 
industrial relations systems of countries are converging or diverging. This paper analysis 
employment relation systems of three Asian countries-China, India, and Korea- and makes a case 
for diversion in employment relation systems.   
 
 
Globalization can be defined as a process of 
rapid economic, cultural, and institutional 
integration among countries. This unification is 
driven by the liberalization of trade, investment 
and capital flow, technological advances, and 
pressures for assimilation towards international 
standards. Globalization has reduced barriers 
between countries, thereby resulting in 
intensification of economic competition among 
nations, dissemination of advanced management 
practices and newer forms of work organization, 
and in some cases sharing of internationally 
accepted labor standards. On the other side 
globalization has evidently contributed to 
unemployment, increase in contingent labor 
force and a weakening of labor movements.  
The biggest question today is regarding the 
impact of this economic phenomenon on 
employers, employees and industrial relations of 
developed and under-developed countries. 
Supporters of globalization say that free trade 
and increasing foreign direct investment will 
increase employment and earnings in advanced 
and developing countries. Critics argue that 
globalization, in reality has a deleterious effect 
on the wages, employment, working conditions 
of most, though not all developing country 
workers. These negative effects they believe are 
resulting from competition of multinationals and 
selective opening of markets to international 
trade in favor of industrially advanced countries.  
The debate on the impact of globalization is 
not restricted to the above-mentioned areas. It 
has also stirred up an old controversy regarding 
the longer-run trajectory of employment 
relations systems. John Dunlop in his book 
“Industrialism and Industrial Man (1960)” took 
technological development as the main force and 
said that industrialism has commanding logics of 
its own and these logics result in advanced 
industrial societies becoming more alike, despite 
political and cultural differences, and certainly 
more alike than any one of them is like a less 
developed country. Other scholars like 
Doeringer (1981), Piore (1981) have taken 
rulemaking processes and regulatory institutions 
respectively as the main focus and concluded 
that all countries show tendencies to 
institutionalize their arrangements of rule 
making and there is convergence as far as 
regulatory institutions are concerned.  
Developing countries under global pressures 
are trying to stay on the economic map. In order 
to do so these countries are taking steps to make 
sure that compared to other developing countries 
their economic environment provides more 
incentives to multi-national companies and 
attracts more foreign direct investment. The 
argument is that the developing nations, in an 
attempt to achieve these overall goals are 
making legal changes and adopting new 
employment practices which are similar to each 
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other and their employment relations are moving 
towards the same direction. These similarities 
can range from lay off policies, collective 
bargaining structures, and legal rights of workers 
to worker safety legislation. At the workplace 
level this convergence, according to the 
scholars, is taking two forms: functional 
flexibility aimed at increasing the skills of 
workers and making them multi-task for 
producing complex goods and services, and 
numerical flexibility characterized by lack of 
unionization, increased contingent workers and 
Taylorist work practices.  
On the other hand, Ira Katznelson and 
Aristide Zolberg in their book “Working-Class 
Formation (1986)” took formation of the 
working class as a major and crucial outcome of 
industrial development and concluded by their 
case studies of industrialized countries that there 
are as many variations as there are cases. They 
attributed these distinctions to the differences to 
political and legal backgrounds, and the 
character of the regime within each of these 
countries. Derbishire and Katz (1997) coined the 
phrase ‘converging-divergence’ to describe 
commonalities in the changes underway in 
employment relations across countries (Bamber, 
2001). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Influencing Variables 
• Labor Influence. 
• Employer Influence. 
• State Influence. 
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Divergence in 
levels and types 
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They believed that there is little evidence of 
convergence, in fact there are variations and 
they categorized the emerging patterns as low 
wage (managerial discretion, hierarchical work 
patterns, piece-rates, anti-union, and high 
turnover), HRM (corporate culture, directed 
teams, better wages, contingent pay, individual 
careers, and union substitution), Japanese 
oriented (Standardized procedures, problem-
solving teams, high pay linked with seniority, 
and enterprise unionism), and joint team based 
(joint decision making, semi-autonomous teams, 
high pay career development and union and 
employee involvement). Finally, the 
institutionalists believe that institutional 
influences remain important in shaping 
employment relations. They see the importance 
of the interaction of several factors, including 
economic strategies, culture, and the role of the 
state, in the debate of convergence and 
divergence. They see employment relations 
systems as strongly institutionalized within 
wider business systems that are, in effect, 
specific to the particular societies in which they 
take shape, making convergence unlikely. 
Due to the enormity of the task it was not 
possible to discuss the issue of convergence and 
divergence at the global level in this paper. 
Therefore, I will try to answer this question with 
reference to three countries -China, India and 
South Korea- representing three different 
political systems in Asia. I will attempt to 
analyze what type of policy changes these 
countries are making to attract foreign 
investments and whether these policies are 
resulting in similar employment relations 
systems or not. The choice of these countries 
was made not only because of the fact that they 
have different political traditions, but also 
because of their high level of exposure to 
globalization, and their levels of economic and 
industrial development. The argument in my 
paper is that pressures of globalization tend to 
change the employment relations of countries. 
These pressures, however, interact with 
domestic factors of economic systems, political 
histories, forms of government, legal histories, 
industrial stages, exposure to globalization, labor 
influence and state influence in each country and 
different variations of policies regarding 
industrial relations are manifested, leading to 
divergence, as shown in figure 1. I will also, in 
the discussion of the countries, try to establish 
how these changes are affecting the relative 
influence of the actors of employment relations-
state, employer and employees- in these 
countries.  
CHINA 
China with the largest population in the 
world has a labor force of 778.1 million (2003 
est.). By occupation 50% of the country’s labor 
force is in agriculture, 22 % in industry and 28% 
in services. The share of these sectors in the total 
GDP does not commensurate to the percentage 
of people employed: agriculture contributes 
14%, industry 52.9% and services 32.3%. It has 
an inflation rate of 1.2% and an unemployment 
rate of 10.1%. 
The arrival of socialism in the 
underdeveloped regions, Lenin argued, meant 
that Marx’s prediction of the “withering away of 
the state would be necessarily protracted and 
that a “dictatorship of the proletariat” (that is, 
the communist party) would have to first carry 
out the unfinished tasks of industrialization as a 
precondition for building socialism. This 
argument provided the justification for rejecting 
syndicalist arguments about “workers’ control” 
over factories in favor of the organization of the 
economy under a single party apparatus that 
would manage production and distribution in the 
name of the proletariat (Chen, 2001).  
Based on the above, the Chinese industrial 
relations were characterized by: rejection of 
autonomous forms of workers’ organizations in 
favor of single, centralized trade union 
federation, importance of the state enterprises 
(danwei) as the center of productivity and 
distribution of basic necessities and services. 
Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
was publicly committed to the welfare of 
workers, the party nevertheless opposed any 
independent action by workers and designated 
the All-China Federation of Trade unions 
(ACFTU) as the official intermediary between 
the workers and the party-state.  
The Chinese economic planning was done as 
the whole economic system was one large firm. 
The economic system was dominated by the 
SOEs (State owned enterprises), however the 
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China also had COEs (owned by responsible 
collectives), and DPEs (owned by individuals). 
The government support was for the SOEs, 
therefore, other types of firms were fewer in 
number and were less developed (Zhu, 1995). In 
the traditional system there were two kinds of 
employees: permanent employees (based on iron 
rice bowl system i.e. lifelong employment) and 
temporary employment. Majority of workers 
were permanent employees with the control of 
all aspects of their employment under the control 
of the state labor personnel departments (Zhu, 
1995).  
Recent Changes 
While the industrial relations in China have 
undergone significant change since the 
implementation of the “Four modernizations” 
reform program in 1978, the Chinese party has 
remained firmly entrenched in power (Chen, 
2001). The Chinese economic reform leading to 
transformation of labor relations has proceeded 
in two directions. First, newly formed non-
public-owned sectors such as joint ventures and 
private enterprises encompass public owned 
sector and attack the latter’s privileges (Baek, 
2000). These new enterprises have brought in 
stricter worker discipline, numerical flexibility 
by bringing in labor contract systems and have 
distanced themselves from the social burdens of 
unemployment, over-employment and worker 
welfare. Second, the internal structures-which 
would be discussed later in detail- of the state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), have also undergone 
considerable change.  
To achieve the above mentioned goals the 
Chinese government has pursued three 
interrelated labor policies: first, it has introduced 
labor contract systems. The experiment started 
in 1983 but was made into a law in 1986. The 
new system introduced the “contract system 
employees”. The contract must be for at least 
one year and had provisions covering major 
topics of probation, job requirements, working 
conditions, remuneration, discipline and 
penalties. In addition to this, the old style 
temporary workers-seasonal industrial workers 
working under a labor agreement of limited 
duration- remained intact. In state and collective 
owned enterprises there are permanent, 
temporary and contract workers. In foreign-
invested enterprises (FIEs), there is a mix of 
temporary and contract employees, and in 
individual owned there are only temporary 
employees (Zhu, 1995).  
Second, the wage system has been changed 
to bring in wage disparities. The idea behind the 
wage reform is that the performance should be 
linked with enterprise productivity and 
individual performance (Zhu, 1995). Third, the 
government has marketized the social security 
by transferring the responsibility of social 
welfare from work units to individuals (Baek, 
2000). This policy has disintegrated the work 
unit based socialist safety net that has 
guaranteed full and lifetime employment and has 
brought in insurance systems.  
Ideological Issues 
The concept of nation-state and nationalism 
is deeply embedded in the Chinese communist 
party ideology. It had its roots in the resistance 
to the occupation of China by the western 
powers in the mid nineteenth century. Mao 
Zedong accepted that the world is “divided 
along ideological fault lines but he believed that 
it was still a world of nation-states. His aim was 
that the Chinese nation-state should take its 
rightful place in this “inter-national” world” 
(Knight, 2003). The split from Communist 
Russia and the Cultural Revolution reduced 
China’s contact with the world and the emphasis 
was made on self reliance and independence. 
After Mao’s death in 1978, Deng Xiaoping 
made it legally possible to introduce economic 
measures based on capitalist thought to gain 
rapid economic (Knight, 2003). This “opening to 
the outside” (duiwai kaifang), or the “open door 
policy” not only meant western economic 
policies, but also the opening to western ideas 
and culture. Even with this major shift in policy 
the Chinese party leaders still considered that the 
world consists of nation-states.  
Since the Asian economic crisis of 1997, 
and the return of Hong Kong to China, the 
Chinese leadership has started looking at the 
world as ‘global’ (Knight, 2003). The new 
concept is that China needs to engage in the 
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process of globalization so as to benefit the 
Chinese nation-state. Nick Knight in his article 
“Imagining globalization: The world and Nation 
in Chinese Communist Party Ideology” has 
described the Chinese Communist party 
orientation to globalization in five points. First, 
globalization has developed out of the 
imperative need of capitalist enterprises to seek 
the most profitable site of investment. Second, 
while the term “globalization” might be new, the 
tendency of capitalism to become global is not. 
Third, globalization is not driven by technology, 
but development of requisite technology has led 
to mobility of capital and expansion. Fourth, 
globalization leads to homogenization, but this 
phenomenon would not lead to assimilation as 
local cultures would counterbalance the erosive 
effects. Lastly, the nation-state will remain in 
existence and would exist central to the contest 
between the forces for and against the neo-
liberal economic agenda. 
Owing to the recent changes in the Chinese 
economic system, academics like Harry 
Williams believe that if socialism is defined as 
equality and democracy in society, politics and 
economy then China has ceased to be a socialist 
state. Whether China is still a socialist state or 
not is a question for another research paper but 
the economic changes discussed above and the 
Chinese view on globalization has initiated a 
debate in China on the effects and policies 
related to globalization. Some writers like Nick 
Knight believe that engagement with global 
economy will lead China to a capitalist system 
and would not lead to realization of socialist 
goals as seen by the communist party. On the 
other hand, there is also a strand of thought 
expressed by academics like James Petras 
(2000), which is also supported by the view of 
the Chinese communist party as discussed above 
that neo-capitalism would lead to social 
cleavages, fragmentations and enhanced control 
of Western nations and in particular the US, on 
the Chinese economy. Therefore, the 
opportunity of globalization should be used to 
initiate a socialist renewal by a new strategy of 
development from below, structural adjustment 
policy where property is re-socialized, rural 
cooperatives are re-introduced, illicit wealth is 
confiscated and the policy of selective openings 
is pursued. 
Privatization 
Thousands of state owned enterprises (SOE) 
were sold as stress was put on privatization in 
the fifteenth session of the Chinese Communist 
Central Party Committee in 1997, (Taylor, 
2002). This policy is seen as an important 
element in increasing efficiency and achieving 
‘market socialism’. In China, privatization can 
take several forms, but it essentially entails 
transfer of control (though not always 
ownership) from public to private interests 
(Taylor, 2002). Ideologically, privatization is 
considered as an attempt to increase compliance 
to reforms by workers and managers aimed at 
financial self-reliance. Privatization does not, 
however, mean that the Chinese economic 
system is becoming more capitalist, but on the 
other hand, the emphasis is on financial self 
reliance of the enterprises with political 
accountability in tact (Taylor, 2002).  
Numerous bankers and economists consider 
‘big bang’ or ‘shock therapy’-whereby state 
swiftly and indefinitely withdraws from 
ownership and market forces fill the vacuum- as 
the only solution to overcome the evils of 
socialism. However, China’s privatization has 
occurred with an intact authoritarian system and 
by adopting a gradualistic and incremental 
approach. In a study done by Bill Taylor (2002) 
on seven enterprises in Guangdong and 
Shanghai, the writer has come to the conclusion 
that “while in some cases, the state sold 
significant ownership rights over its enterprises, 
the picture of privatization is complex than mere 
share ownership. Ownership and control remain 
largely aligned, and control is maintained within 
the firms”. Except for joint ventures where clear 
identifiable partners are visible and directorships 
were according to the percentage of shares 
owned, enterprises mostly had internal cadres 
and managers as board of directors and these 
enterprises represented a continuation of existing 
interests rather than a transformation in the 
ownership structure. In enterprises owned 100% 
by the corporate management, there was an 
agreement that the senior managers will run the 
enterprise according to a contract and with 
specific targets set by state agencies.  
According to the managers of these 
enterprises the state still exerted direct pressure 
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in the shape of forced mergers into larger 
enterprise groups controlled by state authorities. 
The state also had indirect influence, such as 
following the government cadre system in 
reorganizing enterprise’s management. 
According to Bill Taylor these cases do not 
make clear that if there was any privatization at 
all. But one thing from these cases is clear that 
the state no longer underwrites an enterprise’s 
finance. Privatization has given some autonomy 
to the plant to operate independently from direct 
outside interference. This independence has led 
to policies by managers in which market is now 
being used as primary criterion by which 
organizational and individual performance is 
measured. 
There has been a gradualist reform 
movement, in which privatization has very 
limited but definite impact on reconstitution of 
industrial relations. There is increased pressure, 
discipline and threat of redundancies. There is 
removal of state guarantees. Market is now seen 
as real. Mangers are now freer to take decisions, 
but they are also responsible of their actions and 
financial decisions to the state. Party is still very 
important and central to the whole system as 
“the cadre’s career is still decided largely by the 
party, the workers still have a say over the 
performance of cadres, and the material and 
market are still largely determined by the state 
and other SOEs” (Taylor, 2002).  
The process of marketization, which puts 
emphasis on privatization, also includes reform 
of the SOEs. These reforms started with a report 
in 1997 by the State Commission for Economic 
Restructuring. The report envisaged that 15 to 
20 million surplus workers in the state sector 
would loose jobs by 2000. With the latest 
reforms the enterprises have made some 
significant gains in autonomy over the 
recruitment and retention of employees. The 
needs for efficiency and flexibility have been 
met by mass lay-offs and this has created the 
problem of a large surplus of workers laid-off 
from the SOEs. To overcome the problem an 
internal market has developed within many large 
SOEs. Workers are shifted from overmanned 
core production units and into new sub-
companies set up for the absorption of surplus 
labor (Sheehan, 2000). Some SOEs have set up 
labor pools for surplus labor where they can 
undergo retraining and can be absorbed in new 
jobs, also there is a movement of labor from 
semi-skilled to unskilled service industry jobs. 
Since 1995 labor law has also made local 
governments to find work for the laid-off 
workers so as not to leave the entire burden on 
the SOEs. Although the role of the government 
in determining SOEs levels of employment has 
reduced considerably, still the government has 
some influence or authority. Enterprises may 
still be compelled to employ workers (often 
those laid off by other enterprises) whom they 
do not need or want, or loss making enterprises 
may be merged with more successful ones 
against the latter’s will (Sheehan, 2000). 
Collective Bargaining 
In a planned economy the reconciliation of 
interests of the managers and the workers is 
conducted under an administrative framework 
and through guarantees from the government. 
The recent attempts of the Chinese government 
to integration with the world economy have 
resulted in growing divergence between the 
interests of the managers and workers. This 
divergence was expressed by an increase in 
labor disputes-the number of registered labor 
disputes went up from 33,000 in 1995 to 
155,000 in 2001. Owing to this, a new 
institutional framework was introduced that 
centered on: legal and contractual regulations of 
labor relations, a system of tripartite labor 
disputes, development of workplace ‘collective 
consultation’ between trade unions and 
employers and most recently a  system of 
tripartite consultation (Clarke, 2004). 
The 1994 Labor Law formalized the 
individual labor contracts. However, legal 
foundation for the collective contracts was laid 
down in 1992 Trade Union Law. Initially, the 
stress by the government and the enterprises was 
on individual contracts but the ACFTU-All 
Chinese Federation of Trade Unions- led a 
campaign and was able to secure the approval of 
the state and the party, which eventually led to 
an increase in collective contracts. In these 
collective contracts the parties make sure that 
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guidelines given by local labor bureaus and 
government directives are followed. The 
government bodies check the legality of the 
contracts but enterprises develop their own 
practices. The ACFTU is performing a dual role 
in the arrangement. On the one hand it is 
defending the rights of employees and on the 
other it is assigned by the party to promote 
reform and maintain social stability. 
To ensure that the rights and interests of 
workers and staff members are represented by 
trade unions the traditional method of 
‘consultation’ is still in use. The proposals of 
management or trade unions are referred to 
lower levels of discussion, and comments and 
suggestions are reported back to the enterprise 
trade union. The process has its deficiencies but 
it has been found that when properly 
implemented this was a good method to illicit 
opinion (Clarke, 2004). Wage negotiations are 
usually conducted separately from the collective 
contract, although sometimes, minimum wages 
are specified. In joint ventures the trade unions 
tend to take a position that is a little more 
independent of management than in the SOEs. 
This was primarily because of its role in 
ensuring that the management adhered to the 
provisions of the labor laws and regulations 
(Clarke, 2004). Despite the often gross 
exploitation of the workers in foreign 
enterprises, local government and trade unions 
have kept themselves largely out of them so as 
not to frighten off foreign investors. The party 
and the labor administration also do not have 
any power over them to agree to a contract.  
To sum up, it can be said that collective 
consultation has not introduced a new system for 
labor negotiations because it has been integrated 
in the traditional system of consultation. The 
system is less participatory and the trade unions 
normally defers to the management’s judgment 
in the name of interests of the enterprise. No 
substantive details are incorporated in the 
collective contracts; at best these contracts 
remind the employers of their legal obligations 
and monitoring and implementation of labor 
legislation in the workplace. The trade unions do 
not provide an effective channel through which 
members aspirations or grievances could be 
expressed. According to the system, the trade 
union organizations may not be subject to the 
routine intervention of the party and state. The 
social and the institutional structure within 
which labor relations are regulated have not 
changed radically and they will not change until 
the enterprise trade union develops into an 
organization that, in its structure and practice, 
disengages from management and represents 
interests of its members. 
Conflict Resolution 
According to Seung Wook Baek (2000) in 
China, beginning in the early 1990s there was a 
growing incidence of wildcat strikes without any 
union presence or organization, especially in 
MNCs. The economic reforms initiated by the 
government had taken the safety net away from 
the workers and had put many vulnerable 
enterprises into bankruptcy and this resulted in a 
rapid increase in labor disputes. Between 1987 
and 1992 collective labor disputes increased six 
times. In the first half of 1994, 1104 collective 
petitions and strikes were reported to have 
occurred (Baek, 2000). One of the responses of 
the Chinese government was to recognize the 
need for establishing collective bargaining 
structures. As the second response, the State 
Council promulgated the Provisional 
Regulations on the Settlement of Labor Disputes 
in State-owned enterprises on July, 1987. This 
was the first attempt to establish labor disputes 
through institutional procedures since 1955, 
when formal procedures to handle labor disputes 
were abolished and the department of letters and 
visits (Xinfang) was made responsible to handle 
disputes. 
The regulations established a three level 
basis of settling disputes: internal mediation 
within the enterprise, arbitration at local levels 
based on tripartite principle and final resolution 
by People’s Courts. Later on July 6, 1993, the 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Settlement of Labor Disputes in 
Enterprises were introduced. The new regulation 
inherited the three tier system but was widened 
to include all enterprises beyond state owned 
enterprises, and the range of items of labor 
disputes was also widened (Baek, 2000). 
Arbitrators and arbitration tribunals were also 
created. However, the enterprise mediation 
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committee was changed from a mandatory to 
advisory requirement (Baek, 2000). With the 
institutionalization of mediation and arbitration 
process the trade unions were given an 
additional role in the procedure. The chairmen 
of enterprise trade unions presided as the chair 
of mediation committees, and the higher level 
trade unions participated in arbitration 
committees (Baek, 2000). However, in such 
situations the unions are more in the role of 
mediators rather than organizers of workers. The 
implication of procedures to handle labor 
disputes is that where the official system to 
handle labor disputes is observed, collective 
action is prohibited in principle (Baek, 2000). 
Due to the union’s lack of organization of 
workers the other problem is that such mediation 
and arbitration bodies mostly exist in state-
owned enterprises and in the private sector such 
bodies do not exist. 
Industrial Law  
Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution states 
“Citizens of People’s Republic of China enjoy 
freedom of speech, of press, of assembly, of 
association, of procession and of 
demonstration”. The extent of these rights is 
limited by Article 1 which states “The People’s 
Republic of China is a socialist state under the 
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the 
working class and based on alliance of workers 
and peasants”. These two articles put together 
give rise to a complication, workers point to the 
Article 35, and the state responds with Article 1, 
to justify arrests and imprisonments on the 
ground that strikes and other such industrial 
unrest threatens the existence of worker’s state, 
and more recently , to the implementation of rule 
of law (Chen, 2003). 
China had no unified labor law until 1 
January, 1995. Prior to 1995, Model Outline of 
Intra-Enterprise Discipline Rules (MOIDR) was 
prevalent, and as is clear from the title this was 
only aimed at industrial peace and definition of 
worker’s legal rights. The 1995 law applies to all 
employing units, state organs, public institutions 
and laborers ‘who form a labor relationship’ 
with the employer. The law however, does not 
define laborer and in practice domestic workers, 
senior government officials, civil servants, rural 
laborers and sex workers are left outside the 
scope of the law. The law defines individual 
contract as an ‘an agreement that establishes 
relationship between a laborer and an employing 
unit i.e. it is the legal basis of labor relations’. If 
the relationship can be established then the 
employer is legally bound to fulfill the 
requirements of the labor law even without a 
contract. However, the existence of a contract 
does not guarantee compliance with its terms.  
Collective contracts present a unique 
problem. A genuine collective contract is one 
which is between independent organ of workers 
and the employer, but Article 10 of the Trade 
Union Law particularly outlaws freedom of 
association. Collective contracts are approved by 
the labor bureau and if they violate any 
regulation they are rendered invalid. The law 
does not give any further explanation. It also 
does not have any provisions for changes and 
cancellation of the collective contract. Although 
there is a high coverage of the collective 
contracts but high rate of incidents of disputes 
gives a different picture as to the efficacy of 
these contracts.  
Coming to individual workers, the law 
provides grounds for summary dismissal of 
probationary employees due to various offences. 
The concept of labor discipline is not explained. 
Employees can be dismissed simply for under 
investigatio for criminal charges. The law also 
gives great scope for blacklisting militants and 
also provides provisions for mass lay-offs.  
Wages for most of China’s employees are 
determined by a mixture of market forces and 
government intervention (Chen, 2003). States 
implement a system of minimum wages based 
on local conditions, average number of family, 
lowest expenses needed to live, productivity, 
labor market and regional differences in 
employment. Working hours are limited to 40 
hours a week. Overtime is limited to three hours 
per day. However, there are a number of clauses 
in the law that allows the management to extend 
working hours in ‘special circumstances’.  
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Trade Unions 
After 1949, Chinese trade unions, which had 
been strong in urban sectors before 1949, were 
weakened through a series of successive 
historical upheavals, such as the down fall of the 
vice-chairman of ACFTU, in the late 50s, the 
Great Leap Forward when the slogan of ‘abolish 
trade unions’ appeared, and the Cultural 
Revolution when the trade unions were 
abolished (Baek, 2000). In the mid 1980s the 
ACFTU started to reorganize itself and made 
efforts to represent workers’ interests by 
participating in policy making process e.g. the 
1994 Labor Law. However, it is quite evident 
that the economic reform gives trade unions a 
secondary importance. Also the support of trade 
unions by ordinary workers is not so active. 
There has been a recent trend towards 
increase in trade unions mostly in SOEs. But the 
trade unions in SOEs are still dependent 
organizations directly under the control of state 
and party with least involvement of rank and 
file. Also the expenses of enterprise unions are 
very dependent on their income provided by the 
enterprises as their main source of income 
(Baek, 2000). The prominent characteristic of 
Chinese enterprise union is its range of 
membership. On one extreme the party secretary 
or the factory director can also join the same 
union as marginal workers, including contract 
and provisional workers. This particular feature 
impedes the development of unions in China 
into truly rank and file workers’ organizations. 
There is also a shortage of full time union 
cadres, as in a recent change in the law in 1994 
the union cadres are now paid by the enterprises, 
which makes it beneficial for the enterprises to 
further keep the number low.  
The purpose of the unions has always been 
to educate and organize the masses of the 
workers to support the laws and regulations of 
the government. The new law provides a lot of 
changes but still unions are not considered as a 
vehicle of social change and reform. The three 
tier union system-enterprise union, county level 
and nationwide organization (ACFTU) - still is 
being used as an organ to improve production 
efficiency. Chinese trade unions, in reality, have 
taken the role of department of labor 
management in enterprises. The quality of cadre 
was always low and still is, and the economic 
reforms have not changed anything in this 
practice. The discretionary power of trade 
unions has gradually been reduced. 
INDIA 
The Republic of India with a population of 
just over a billion is the second most populous 
state in the world after China. It has a population 
growth rate of 1.4% and literacy rate of 60%. 
Ethnically the Indian is dominated by Indo-
Aryan race that is 72% of the total population. 
On religious lines the population is dominated 
by Hindus who are 81.3%. The Indian labor 
force is 406 million, with 60% in agriculture, 
17% industry and 23% services. 
Industrial Relations before 1991  
Like most of the countries with colonial 
origin, India based most of its laws on the 
colonial structure left by the British. Industrial 
law was no exception, the Indian government 
built on colonial labor institutions and 
regulations to fashion an industrial relation 
system that sought to control industrial conflict 
through a plethora of protective labor legislation, 
influenced by the strong ties between the major 
political parties and labor forged in the struggle 
of independence (Kuruvilla, 2002). These laws 
covered a wide range of aspects of workplace 
industrial relations; including detailed laws on 
safety and health, dismissals and layoffs and 
industrial disputes. The basic purposes of these 
laws, like under the British colonial rule, were to 
contain industrial disputes within the framework 
provided by the laws and maintain continuity of 
production. One example of this strategy was the 
Industrial Disputes Act. This act allowed 
employers to layoff employees only temporarily, 
with compensation up to 180 days and employer 
was also required to get permission from the 
government which was rarely given because of 
the close ties of the unions with the political 
parties. On the other hand the right to strike 
existed but all strikes needed due notices and 
strikes could be brought to an end with either 
party requesting for a third party intervention 
through government conciliation offices. If 
conciliation failed the government had the right 
to refer the dispute to compulsory arbitration or 
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to a labor court or industrial tribunal for a final 
decision (Kuruvilla, 2002).  
In addition to the above policy, the Indian 
industrial relations were also tilted more towards 
the workers. In the absence of social security 
legislation the burden of social policy like 
retirement, medical care and even child care was 
left on the employers. During this period the 
economic policy emphasized on the growth and 
long-term development of heavy industries in 
the public sector with largely indigenous 
technology, coupled with the policy of industrial 
licensing, import controls, and restrictions on 
foreign ownership  that protected public and 
private sector firms from international 
competition(Kuruvilla, 2002). These 
protectionist policies created an atmosphere that 
led to increased inefficiency in the firms, over 
employment –especially in public sector-
inability to introduce efficient and labor saving 
methods of production. These problems were 
enhanced by the fact that there was a relatively 
high incidence of labor strikes and also 
competition among various unions as there was 
no sole-bargaining agent legislation. The unions 
themselves were not united and at the same time 
there was not much of a spirit of cooperation 
between the employees and the employers. 
There was diversity not only in unions but also 
in industrial relations laws, each state had the 
right to enact its own labor laws. This feature 
produced a variety of local colors of unions with 
varying orientations to labor relations and for the 
most part kept the labor movement from become 
national. 
Union density was about 38% in the formal 
sector workers. As can be ascertained from 
above, the unions had an influential voice due to 
their links with political parties, in fact all 
political partied had their union wings. Unions 
were mostly structured on enterprise, industrial, 
political or regional lines. Bargaining structure 
during this period was industrial or enterprise 
based, although there was provision in the laws 
for tripartite structures and works council type 
institutions but these were not followed in 
practice (Kuruvilla, 2002). There was inter-
union rivalry and adversarial relationship with 
the employers. Although the employers were 
protected by the state policies of protectionism, 
still they faced the problem of high costs and 
rigid systems of production.  
Since 1991 
As long as the protectionist policies were in 
place the higher cost and the relative lack of 
flexibility imposed by the industrial relations 
systems regulations did not pose a serious 
problem because Indian manufacturers did not 
have to compete in the international market. 
With the coming of globalization, the 40 year 
old policy of protectionism proved inadequate 
for Indian industry to remain competitive. 
Therefore, in 1992 the process of liberalization 
started. The balance of power shifted in the 
favor of the employers. Apart from the pressure 
from the international market, international 
bodies like IMF also exerted pressure to change 
labor policies in India. Employers pushed for 
workforce reduction, given their inability to 
retrench employees, they introduced policies of 
voluntary retirement schemes. There has been an 
increase in the demand for functional and 
numerical flexibility in the workplace by the 
employers.  
Globalization has also brought in the 
beginning of a government-employer coalition. 
This coalition is quite obvious keeping in view 
the enthusiastic support of the government for 
economic liberalization. In Maharashtra for 
example for the first time the government has 
declared several private sector firms as ‘essential 
and public utilities’ permitting a ban on strikes 
in these sectors (Kuruvilla, 2002).  
In a study by Hiers and Kuruvilla in 1997, 
they discuss the changes in the industrial 
relations in India and bring out the following 
dimensions: 
• Collective bargaining in India has 
mostly been decentralized, but now in 
sectors where it was not so, are also 
facing pressures to follow 
decentralization. 
• Some industries are cutting employment 
to a significant extent to cope with the 
domestic and foreign competition e.g. 
pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, in 
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other industries where the demand for 
employment is increasing are 
experiencing employment growths.  
• In the expansionary economy there is a 
clear shortage of managers and skilled 
labor. 
• The number of local and enterprise level 
unions has increased and there is a 
significant reduction in the influence of 
the unions.  
• Under pressure some unions and 
federations are putting up a united front 
e.g. banking. 
• Another trend is that the employers have 
started to push for internal unions i.e. no 
outside affiliation. 
• HR policies and forms of work are 
emerging that include, especially in 
multi-national companies, multi-skills, 
variable compensation, job rotation etc. 
These new policies are difficult to 
implement in place of old practices as 
the institutional set up still needs to be 
changed. 
• HRM is seen as a key component of 
business strategy. 
• Training and skill development is also 
receiving attention in a number of 
industries, especially banking and 
information technology. 
Keeping in view the above analysis, it is 
quite evident that the industrial system right now 
is trying to shift from the old system to the new. 
In the process, it is experiencing tension 
between the workers who are trying to keep jobs 
and the employers who are trying to achieve 
flexibility so as to cope with the domestic and 
international market competition. In essence, 
these practices have accentuated the diversity 
existing in the Indian industrial system 
considerably. Some analysts like Bhatacharjee 
(2001) suggest that there is so much variation in 
the Indian industrial relations that it is no longer 
appropriate to think of one “national” Indian 
industrial relations system. However, the shift is 
now away from maintaining labor peace and 
towards the increase in firm level 
competitiveness through basically numerical 
flexibility as India becomes more integrated into 
the world economy (Kuruvilla, 2002). 
Actors 
The role of the state in the industrial 
relations depends on the ideological (socialist, 
communist, or neo-capitalist persuasion), 
political (neo-colonial, democratic, 
dictatorships) and socio economic (protectionist 
and neo-liberal policies) orientation 
(Sivananthiran, 1999). In India the role of the 
state may be studied over four time periods: 
colonial period, post colonial period, emergency 
era (1975-77), and post liberalization era. 
During the colonial period under the British the 
industrial relations were just another means of 
keeping the colonies in line, the labor law and 
the power of the state was used to maintain 
peaceful industrial relations so as to have 
continued production.  
In the post colonial era, the Indian 
government more or less built its labor relations 
structure on the pre-existing colonial law; the 
main purpose was again to achieve industrial 
peace. At the same time, in India there was 
political support for the Indian unions and there 
were laws that protected the rights of the worker 
but the main purpose again was that industrial 
peace should be maintained. The Indian state 
was tolerant of unions and recognized the value 
of labor management cooperation in the context 
of planned economic development. There was 
more burden on the employers but protectionist 
policies kept the employers complacent. During 
the emergency rule the rights of the unions were 
restricted, but this era did not have a lasting 
effect on the industrial relations. In the era of 
globalization and liberalization, the government 
has realized that in order to keep India 
competitive, policies should be implemented 
that result in flexible workplace practices. The 
employers are now facing the pressures of global 
competition, and they also want to remain 
competitive. For this purpose the stress is now 
on more pro- employer policies. 
The role of the state has always been 
pervasive in Indian industrial relations.  There 
have always been detailed laws on collective 
bargaining, dispute resolution, employee 
participation and employment security. There is 
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also a court system, the independent labor courts 
in India are the main mechanism for the 
implementation of labor law. 
During the independence movement, the 
political leaders also held leadership positions in 
major trade unions, they led and supported trade 
union movements in major industries. After the 
independence (1947) many trade union leaders 
held important positions in the government. 
Besides, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
the Indian government opted for socialistic 
ideology based on the principles of controlled 
economy. During this period the government 
had three basic policies: industrialization 
through public sector, creation of democratic 
institutions and protecting the interests of 
working class. Therefore, during this period and 
till liberalization the union membership 
increased. The verified membership of the All 
India Central Trade Union Organizations 
(CTUOs) –includes a total of 12 central trade 
union organizations- increased from about 2 
million to over 12 million between 1960-1989 
(Sivananthiran, 1999). This membership data, 
however, did not include unions which are not 
affiliated to CTUOs.  
An important aspect of union influence is 
union finances, in India, unlike China, the 
unions are financially independent. The main 
source of income of trade unions is union dues 
from their members, which account for 70% of 
the total income. The second major source of 
income is donations, which account for 16% of 
the income. The rest of the income is from sale 
proceeds of publications, interests of 
investments and miscellaneous receipts 
(Sivananthiran, 1999). One problem faced by the 
Indian unions in finances is that the dues taken 
from the union members are not huge as the 
wages are not as high as in industrial countries, 
and even these minimal dues are difficult to 
collect in the absence of any “check-off” system.  
The Trade Union Act of 1926, which guides 
and protects trade unions, provides that all 
unions should have a constitution and should be 
governed by democratic principles. The purpose 
of the act was to promote transparency and 
democracy in union structures. In practice, 
however, legal requirements mandated by the act 
are not fully complied with. There are elections 
for union officials but in most of the cases same 
people keep on getting elected. Rank and file 
participation is not adequate, the general 
membership only comes in the scene when there 
is a pending issue regarding wages etc involved. 
During normal times the membership 
participation is very low. One issue related to 
less membership participation is the lack of 
professionalism of the union leaders. The leaders 
and organizers do not make strategies regarding 
succession plans, development of leadership and 
proper propaganda to involve rank and file 
members. Finally, non-participation of women 
in union work is also a sign of the absence of 
union democracy. 
As already discussed, most of the unions are 
affiliated with political parties of different 
political orientation ranging from socialist to 
Hindu fundamentalist. These political parties 
have their issues among themselves and these 
issues are also reflected in their union wings. 
Due to this reason there is very little unity in the 
trade unions in India. There have been some 
attempts to unify the unions, mainly by leftist 
trade unions but they have not been so 
successful. Along with the lack of unity another 
issue that has kept unions from becoming more 
influential is that they have not really involved 
themselves in social issues. There are few 
unions who take up non-bargaining activities 
like population control or adult literacy 
programs, but there is no major effort in this 
direction. 
With liberalization the greatest fears faced 
by unions are: privatization, redundancy in the 
public sector and unemployment, flexibility and 
multi-skilling leading to inadequate skills in 
present workers, and changing structure of the 
labor market making it more profitable for the 
employer to employ part-time workers. The 
introduction of National Exit Policy, which 
allows industry to rationalize their workforce by 
paying previously agreed upon compensation for 
separation, is a new cause of concern for the 
unions. The government has under National 
Renewal Fund policy proposed to close sick 
units, bring in MNCs, and abolish licensing and 
restrictive controls in order to create a free 
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market economy. Labor unions are generally 
opposed to these measures and believe that these 
would adversely affect the unions. In view of the 
above there is a clear and urgent need for unions 
to reorganize themselves. They should try to 
achieve unity, better organization, propaganda, 
development of leadership and stress on 
professionalism. 
Processes 
As we have seen earlier, the main purpose of 
the Indian state was to maintain industrial peace 
therefore, the state intervention by means of 
dispute settlement acts was imperative and 
important. The Industrial Disputes Act passed in 
1947 had its basis in two laws of United 
Kingdom: The Conciliation Act (1896) and the 
Industrial Courts Act (1919). The main 
objectives of the act was to preserve good 
relations between the workers and employers, 
investigate and settle industrial disputes, prevent 
illegal strikes and lock-outs, provide relief to 
workers in matters of lay-offs and retrenchment 
and promotion of collective bargaining. The 
principle techniques of settlement provided in 
the act were; collective bargaining, mediation 
and conciliation, investigation, arbitration, and 
adjudication. All disputes have to go through the 
process of conciliation, the issue should be trade 
union related, and requires disputes to be 
referred by the appropriate government. 
Adjudicators have the power to create, alter and 
modify, vary and set aside contracts, and can 
direct reinstatements in cases of wrongful 
termination. The awards need to be published 
and the government has the right to reject or 
modify the award. Failure to implement the 
award is an unlawful practice and the party can 
be prosecuted for the same. Final award can only 
be challenged by filing a petition to the High 
Court or the Supreme Court.  
Although the process and the Industrial 
Disputes Act are quite comprehensive, the 
biggest problem with it is the delay. The process 
itself is so long and tedious that cases are 
delayed for years and even if they are decided 
the awards are not often implemented by the 
employers especially when the litigant is a 
government or a public sector unit (Ghose, 
2003). To overcome the problem of delays, court 
costs, procedural formalities and adversarial 
justice a new approach to dispute resolution has 
emerged. This system is called the Lok Adalat 
System, literally translated this would mean 
‘Peoples Courts’. The origins of this system are 
in the age old institutions of village Panchayat 
(village courts) and Baradary (Community) 
system. The first experiment of Lok Adalats was 
done in Kalyan near Bombay in 1978(Ghose, 
2003). Chapter VI, of the Legal Services 
Authority Act addresses the establishment of 
Lok Adalats, and states that they would be 
served by retired judges or judicial officers. 
Cases can come to these courts when the courts 
decide that there is a chance for conciliation, 
parties have agreed to approach the Lok Adalat 
and the court is satisfied that the matter is fit for 
the forum. The drawbacks of these courts are 
that they are still sponsored and controlled by 
authorities, the cases are decided by the same 
judges who have served in courts and the Adalat 
can not decide any case without consensus. 
Therefore, all that is needed to scuttle the 
process is that either of the parties refuse to 
agree to conciliation. This new alternate to 
dispute resolution is basically an attempt to 
provide one more forum for conciliation but 
under the control of the authorities, so that the 
pressure on courts and costs of the process could 
be reduced. 
The process of collective bargaining in India 
is going towards decentralization. This 
movement is very much consistent with what is 
happening in other parts of the worlds, 
especially in European countries and America. 
The purpose of this decentralization is to give 
more flexibility to the employer to face the 
competition from abroad. The unions are not 
organized at the national level and there is no 
unity among them anyway to go for a 
centralized bargaining. Like the process of 
collective bargaining, the process of wage 
determination is also controlled by the state. In 
industries, where the public sector dominates, 
the government naturally plays a central role in 
determining wages. In other industries that are 
dominated by private sector, it chooses to play a 
major role by establishing wage boards. In all 
these industries there is little space for collective 
bargaining (Sivananthiran, 1999). The trend 
towards flexibility is not only evident from 
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collective bargaining, it is also apparent from the 
changes in work practices. Now more and more 
firms are introducing new manufacturing 
technologies. Total quality management, leaner 
organizations by eliminating middle 
management and supervisors and more HR 
practices are becoming the norm in industrial set 
ups. The predominant effort of the Indian 
companies is to restructure themselves. Often 
their focus is primarily on numerical flexibility, 
although these efforts are accompanied by more 
dynamic and flexible HR practices that are in 
tune with a long-term orientation to 
competitiveness based on higher technology 
intensive production (Sivananthiran, 1999). 
To sum up, it can be said that the Indian 
state has and is still playing an important role in 
the country’s industrial relations. The basic 
purpose of the state intervention has been to 
maintain industrial peace, but recently with the 
advent of globalization the policy is changing 
towards a more competitive approach. 
KOREA 
The Republic of South Korea (hereafter 
Korea) has a population of 45 million; by the 
late 1990’s almost 80 % was urban, an increase 
from only 30% in 1962 (Bamber, 2001). Korea 
is ethnically homogenous, about half of the 
South Korean population is Buddhist although 
there is significant Christian presence, all have 
inherited Confucian values. In the late 1990’s 
the labor force was 20 million with a 
participation rate of 20%, unemployment was 
not much above 2% yet weekly working hours 
remained the longest for any country reported by 
the ILO. Rapid industrialization through export 
oriented manufacturing has resulted in Korea’s 
per capita gross national product increasing from 
$87 in 1962 to more than $10,000 in 1997. 
Korea is the world’s twelfth largest economy 
and it became a member of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development in 
1996(Bamber, 2001).  
Korea was a 500 year old feudal kingdom 
before it was opened to the outside world by the 
Kangwha Treaty of 1876. Under the feudal 
system, Korea was ruled according to the 
Confucian code of personal, socio and civic 
behavior. The society was rigidly stratified into 
a class system where workers belonged to the 
lower classes and wage labor was rare (Bamber, 
2001). From 1910 to 1945, Korea was under the 
Japanese colonial administration and industrial 
relations were restricted under the Japanese 
authority. After WWII there were several 
changes in the Korean industrial relations 
regulations, the 1953 legislation regarding trade 
unions and labor disputes formally established 
industrial relations in Korea. During the 1945-
1960 period workplace industrial relation in 
major conglomerates known as Chaebols was 
modeled closely on the Japanese system and has 
been described by various authors as 
“paternalistic” or “authoritarian” (Kuruvilla, 
2002).  After the liberation in 1945 there was a 
brief renaissance of unionism but in 1947 the 
leftist unions were banned by the American 
Military Government and were replaced by 
General Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(GFKTU). In 1961 unions were obliged to 
affiliate to industry federations under a 
government sponsored national center known as 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). To 
summarize the Korean industrial relation system 
in the 15 years after WWII, it can be said that 
the system was set up for the subordination of 
workers and trade unions to the combined 
institutionalized interests of a repressive state 
and monopolistic capitalism (Kuruvilla, 2002).  
Under the new martial law in 1981 the 
economic development strategy turned towards 
higher value added exports. To cope with the 
neo-economic policy changes were made in the 
legal system and Japanese style enterprise 
unions were formed. However, the government 
ensured its system of political control by forcing 
all unions to be part of the FKTU. Further, given 
the involvement of both students and church 
organizations, the government prohibited the 
involvement of third parties in unions. While 
these actions are clearly politically motivated, 
they also helped the chaebols to contain or avoid 
industrial conflict and continue their 
authoritarian management styles. The Korean 
Industrial relation system during the period of 
martial law continued to have dispute prevention 
and dispute avoidance as a primary focus of its 
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policies as part of the overall goal of 
maintaining stability. Also the workplace HR 
practices were similar to those of Japan which 
included implicit employment guarantees, 
seniority based wages, and formalized 
recruitment from good schools as well as 
cultural and ideological programs as part of a 
strategy to weaken independent trade unions and 
to purport company loyal unionism (Kuruvilla, 
2002). In the pre 1987 system the union density 
was about 9%, unions were enterprise based 
with compulsory affiliation to FKTU. Collective 
bargaining was limited and was largely 
enterprise based and there was a general focus 
on stability and general flexibility. 
Korean Industrial Relations after 1987 
With the democratization in 1987, the 
Korean industrial relations underwent 
considerable change. With the liberalization of 
the labor law, the labor movement started to 
come out of the shadows of chaebols and the 
government. The union density increased (18.6 
% in 1990) and there was also an increase in 
industrial strikes. With the formation of Korea 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)-an 
independent union federation- the dominance of 
FKTU also reduced. Bargaining also increased 
with the increase in union strength.  
Korean economy had always been heavily 
dependent on the Chaebols. In the 1990s the top 
50 Chaebols accounted for nearly 20% of the 
gross national product and employment and 40% 
of sales in manufacturing (Kim, 2003). 
Therefore, the chaebol response to union 
activism was very important. The chaebol 
response to this new union militancy was a 
mixture of more suppressive polices and 
progressive HR practices. The main response 
since the 1980s, however, has been the adoption 
of hard line methods e.g. hard bargaining, 
dismissal of union activists, and blacklisting 
(Kim, 2003). During this period the labor 
movement was also divided, unions favoring the 
FKTU, keeping in view the need for Korea to be 
competitive, opted for more moderate methods. 
On the other hand independent unions did not 
agree with FKTUs policies and favored KCTU-
which continued to be illegal till 1999.  
The erosion in competitive position also saw 
an increase in Korean investment abroad in low-
cost areas, particularly in Asia and Latin 
America (Kuruvilla, 2002). The employers in 
order to meet the competition increased 
demands for restructuring and flexibility in the 
workplace. The old Japanese style system of life 
long employment was also challenged. These 
demands were met by some degree of resistance 
by the unions but there was some progress 
towards functional flexibility and increasing 
skills as well as restructuring (Kuruvilla, 2002). 
The Government of Kim Young-Sam responded 
to the growing union militancy in 1996 with a 
predawn clandestine reform of labor legislation, 
which on the one hand allowed union 
participation in politics and allowed multiple 
unions at the workplace by 2002, and on the 
other hand avoided recognition of the other peak 
federations until 2000, and most important, 
increased the authority of the employer to lay off 
employees.  
The Crises of 1997 and Recent Changes 
The Asian economic crisis that began in 
1997, led to major changes in Korean industrial 
relations. In 1996 the government had already 
initiated a new approach to industrial relations, 
towards more liberal economic policies and 
against the old paternalistic workplace practices. 
The new bill was strongly opposed by the unions 
and was revised after the largest general strike in 
Korea (Kuruvilla, 2002). However, there were 
more changes in the sane direction, due to the 
IMF bailout of the Korean economy after the 
crisis and the accession of Kim Dae-Jung-
viewed as more friendly to the labor movement 
than his predecessor (Kuruvilla, 2002).  
With IMF’s help the Korean economy was 
able to have a quick recovery. Foreign currency 
reserves increased from $3.9 billion in 1997 to 
$48.5 billion by the end of 1998, while the 
exchange rate, also stabilized around 1,204 
won/US$ (Chang & Chae, 2004). However this 
unexpected quick recovery was done at the 
expense of a vast majority of population. The 
policies during the recovery period had led to 
bankruptcy of the so-called non-competitive 
firms, massive growth of unemployment, 
deterioration of living standards of a huge 
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percentage of population. The most devastating 
impact was on the working class as there was an 
increase in job insecurity, cutting down of 
wages, downsizing of production scale, major 
layoffs. About a million lost their jobs in the 
first half of 1998 (Chang & Chae, 2004).  
The results of the IMF bailout, and coming 
to power of a relatively moderate leader led to 
the 1998 reforms, which brought far reaching 
changes in the Korean employment relations. 
For the first time labor was given participation 
in national decisions through the creation of the 
Tripartite Commission. The Commission issued 
a social pact for dealing with the economic 
crisis, with several key decisions on industrial 
relations (Kuruvilla, 2002). The “February 
Agreement” covered corporate, public, and 
financial sectors and the labor market as well 
(Chang & Chae, 2004). On the labor’s side the 
reforms recognized the KCTU, established an 
unemployment insurance fund coupled with the 
amount and periods of unemployment benefits 
as a part of a social safety net package. It also 
included collective bargaining rights for the 
public sector from 1999, gave freedom to labor 
unions to be active politically, revised labor laws 
to permit layoffs, gave employers the right to 
use temporary labor for periods up to 1 year with 
obligation to give advance notification of layoffs 
and various other obligations in case of layoffs.  
The leadership of KCTU had to face 
massive criticism from its affiliate unions for 
agreeing to the introduction of flexible measures 
at the workplace, particularly the layoffs. The 
agreement was voted down by the affiliates, and 
the affiliates moved for a general strike. The 
labor movement had already lost its basis of 
militancy due to the increasing job insecurity, so 
the strike was not a success. Also the social net 
that was supposed to support the unemployed 
was not very effective (Chang & Chae, 2004).  
Actors 
Korean unions are represented on three 
levels. There are local unions based on the plant, 
an enterprise, a region or an occupation, most 
commonly at the plant or enterprise. Thus all 
union members at a particular plant or 
enterprise, regardless of their occupation, join 
the one local union (Bamber, 2001). The local 
unions make up occupational federations and 
regional councils, the right to negotiate is vested 
in the local unions with regional councils and 
industrial federations having only the right to 
consult and discuss.  
The Korean government only recognized the 
FKTU after it had dismantled the communist 
labor movement in 1949 (Kim, 2003). The 
FKTU, as the only labor union since 1960, has 
received financial support from the government 
and it has remained under government influence. 
Economic success and substantial wage 
increases were used by the government to justify 
authoritarian IR policies. However, “fast 
industrial growth, emergence of a middle class 
population and rising level of education 
provided the political basis for workers” (Kim, 
2003). Therefore, in the late 1970s a strong labor 
movement developed. There was a great 
proliferation of strikes in the 70s and 80s. There 
was also a movement towards independent 
unions that resulted in the formation of Korea 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). The 
KCTU was recognized as a union federation 
after the largest general strike in Korea in 1997. 
Soon after the contentious ‘February 
Agreement’, the state started to intervene in 
industrial conflicts and declared that structural 
adjustments can be a matter of discussion but 
cannot be a matter of struggle, therefore, all 
strikes related to structural adjustments were 
treated as illegal and trade unions leaders were 
imprisoned. In the five year period of 
restructuring after the  agreement the 
government has facilitated marketization of 
control over labor-creating a large scale reserve 
army with job insecurity, competition based 
personnel management, and capability based 
wage systems- it has also removed obstacles in 
order to facilitate marketized labor control and 
ensured a smooth operation of the deregulated 
labor market (Chang & Chae, 2004).  
Although the above discussed situation of 
labor is quite bleak, there are some 
developments that can be termed as major 
watershed in Korean labor movement. The 
public sector, which is 9.28%-70% out of this 
are government employees- of the total 
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workforce, represented a tranquil sector. When 
the crisis of 1997 took away from public sector 
employees, the well developed welfare system 
and permanent employment system, they also 
started to protest. The largest protest, which was 
in fact a unified effort from the five independent 
power plant companies, led to a strike and an 
agreement in April 3rd 2002. In the agreement 
the state got what it wanted but the struggle 
showed that the public sector can also be 
organized and there can be an alliance between 
the public and private sector as the agreement 
was negotiated by KCTU. There have also been 
attempts to organize temporary workers. 
Although there is opposition between the 
temporary and permanent workers, but there 
have been occasions in which irregular workers 
were successfully organized with the 
cooperation with regular workers (Chang & 
Chae, 2004).  
The financial crisis and the recognition of 
KCTU as a legal labor federation led to a sharp 
decline in the membership of FKTU. Due to the 
competition from KCTU the older federation 
had to change its stance to being more 
aggressive, which in itself is a good 
development. Another significant development 
is the trend towards industrial unionism was that 
“the financial crises and the massive layoffs led 
union leaders to realize inherent limitations of 
enterprise unionism” (Kim, 2003). They have 
realized that enterprise level unions cannot 
respond effectively to national level issues and 
crisis. Earlier industrial unions were prohibited 
by law, but two revisions of labor law in 1987 
and 1997 made it lawful and easier to establish 
industrial unions. The shift to industrial unions 
is decisive and quick. In the two year period 
1998-2000, almost 20 industrial unions were 
formed (Kim, 2003). In the long run, the 
movement towards industrial unionism is 
expected to improve the organizing potential of 
Korean labor movement.  
The state, before 1987 acted as a 
‘benevolent dictator. It had an extensive legal 
setup to provide protection to the employees but 
at the same time independent labor movement 
was suppressed. Since democratization its 
approach has mostly been a reaction to certain 
developments, first it was democratization, then 
the 1997 crisis and in between there were labor 
upheavals, which led to hasty and controversial 
structural changes. It is still experimenting with 
policies and strategies. One very important 
feature of the Korean industrial relations is the 
dependence of the country’s economy on the 
chaebols. The state cannot ignore them, and now 
with the increase in union organization the 
chaebols are also becoming more suppressive. 
The Korean government will at some point have 
to decide what role they want to play in the 
industrial relations and how they can achieve 
balance.  
Processes 
Collective bargaining in Korea is regulated 
by the Trade Unions Act. Representatives of a 
union or other appropriate groups can negotiate 
an agreement with the employer or employers’ 
organizations. A union can also entrust the 
negotiation to a union federation with which it is 
affiliated. The law allows multi employer 
bargaining to be conducted at enterprise and 
industry level. Most bargaining takes place at 
the enterprise level, but multi-employer regional 
and national wage bargaining is conducted in 
transport and textile, where there are smaller 
companies and fewer employees. Since 1987, 
collective bargaining has become more 
important in regulating industrial relations, 
however, more than 90% of small enterprises 
have no collective arrangements. 
Another issue with collective arrangement is 
that “since the piece rate was higher than the 
wage increase through collective bargaining in 
the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, workers have 
increasingly accepted the capability based wage 
system” (Chang & Chae, 2004). The result has 
been that the trade unions have faced a decline 
in the collective bargaining process as there is 
less support of it at the floor level. Also 
“continual reformulation of workplace 
organization also undermines trade union 
delegates’ leadership on the shop floor, 
replacing it with increasing authority of foremen 
and team leaders” (Chang & Chae, 2004). 
 The Labor Management Council Act 1980 
stipulates that a Labor Management Council 
(LMC) should be created to meet four times a 
year in any establishment employing 50 or more 
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employees (Bamber, 2001). The councils are 
required to consult with employee 
representatives on issues related to welfare, 
education and training and grievance handling. 
Firms are required to submit the rules of their 
LMCs to the Minister of Labor, who has the 
authority to dissolve them or order the 
reselection of the council. These bodies have 
remained more symbolic in nature and before 
1987 they were used to legitimize the power of 
the enterprise over the workers.  
Mechanisms for resolving disputes have 
long been formalized in Korea. In 1953, a labor 
Relations Commission was established to 
provide conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
of labor disputes. However, disputes in 
‘essential public enterprises’ require longer 
cooling off periods and compulsory arbitration. 
The regulations for ‘major defense industries’ is 
such that a legal strike by their employees is 
virtually impossible (Bamber, 2001).  
In summary we can say that Korean 
industrial relations are in a period of transition: 
the independent labor movement has been 
recognized recently. It is still at embryonic stage 
but on the other hand it is also militant, has 
started to organize more efficiently and has been 
a major source of concern for the government. 
Labor market has changed its outlook; now the 
labor is facing problems of job insecurity, 
capability based wage system, more working 
hours and the use of more HR practices. 
Temporary and daily contracted workers have 
increased tremendously, accounting for a total of 
52% of the total workforce in 2001 (Chang, 
2004). There have been attempts to organize this 
huge portion of workers but the unions are 
obviously facing problems in this matter.  
The transition to democracy coincided with 
the international need for flexibility. This led to 
the erosion of competitive advantage in several 
sectors, particularly in low cost sectors of textile, 
shoes and electronics, which has led to 
migration of Korean firms to other low cost 
areas in the world. The IMF bailout and the 
accession of Kim Dae-Jung have facilitated the 
employers push towards more functional and 
numerical flexibility. This movement has met 
considerable resistance from the labor 
movement and is getting stronger and more 
vociferous. Industrial unionism is also growing, 
which has been important in recent labor 
organization.  
DISCUSSION 
Changes in organization and workplace 
practices are nonstop under globalization. 
According to Professor Rene Ofreneo, if we 
look at this phenomenon we can see some 
drivers behind it: First, technology, which is 
changing how certain products are produced and 
at the same time altering the size and the quality 
of labor that is required to produce those 
products. Second, policies of economic 
liberalization that lead to the opening up of the 
economy, free flow of goods and capital, and 
integration with the world economy. It is also 
leading to privatization policies by governments, 
deregulation of entire sectors, tariff reduction 
and import liberalization. Third, pressures of 
competition, businesses have to adjust to the 
ever increasing global and domestic 
competition. The competition is cut throat and 
companies which are not prepared or 
undercapitalized should either try to upgrade 
themselves or be destroyed by bigger global 
transnational corporations. 
Under the above mentioned pressures we 
have seen that the countries which have been 
discussed have taken a number of steps to link 
them with the world economy. From the cases 
we can, however draw certain conclusions: First, 
in all three cases the initial strategy of the state 
was to achieve industrial tranquility. In China 
industrial stability was imposed by the state in 
the name of the people’s state. In India, first the 
colonial law was implemented, which was aimed 
at keeping colonial workers in line and then later 
through a dispute resolution system, the state 
aimed at keeping the conflict out of the realm of 
strikes. In South Korea the same goal was 
achieved by a coalition between the state and the 
major industry conglomerates. 
Second, in all three cases major structural 
changes started to happen in the 1980s and 90s. 
In India and China it happened because of the 
governmental policies of economic 
liberalization. In Korea it was due to the 
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beginning of the process of democratization that 
led to major industrial relations changes. Third, 
the changes that have occurred in a couple of 
decades are basically in the legislative 
frameworks and more importantly in the 
strategies of the parties. In China there have 
been a lot of changes in the structure of the law 
governing industrial relations. However, in 
industrial relations the most powerful and 
influential party is the state and it can be 
ascertained that there has been a change in the 
strategy of the party that matters the most. The 
Chinese state wanted to enter globalization, 
increase financial viability of the huge state 
owned sector, attract more foreign capital and 
benefit from the whole process, while remaining 
at the centre of the power structure. In India, the 
Indian government has changed its policy since 
the liberalization of the economy; the state is 
now concentrating more on competition and 
attracting foreign capital rather than the previous 
aim of stability. There have not been major 
changes in the legal structure but the strategy of 
the employer has changed drastically. Earlier the 
employers had rigid workplace practices but 
they were complacent because of protectionist 
policies of the government. Now, with the 
increase of global competition the employers 
want flexibility and encouraged by the recent 
changes in the state’s stance they have in fact 
become more vocal for flexibility. In Korea 
there is not much change of strategy as far as the 
state and the employers are concerned, but there 
have been legal changes and the strategy of the 
unions has changed. The unions are now more 
militant than ever, they are trying for labor 
movement unity, industrial unionism and 
experimenting with tripartism.  
Fourth, the most consistent theme in the 
recent changes is the need for flexibility. This 
need is a direct corollary of the global 
competition. The employers want to be flexible 
numerically or functionally or both so that they 
can change and adjust to the changing patterns 
of production. In China, we find that the trend is 
towards both types of flexibilities. In the foreign 
owned sector the Chinese government does not 
interfere at all, in the state owned sector there 
has been a lot of privatization and rationalization 
of redundant workers. Due to these steps there 
have been a lot of layoffs, as a certain amount of 
autonomy has been given to the managers in 
SOEs. In India there is primarily numerical 
flexibility, there is an increase in the irregular 
worker and part time jobs. In Korea, like there is 
a trend towards both types of flexibility.  
The fifth conclusion is actually related to the 
previous point. We have argued that the most 
salient constraint in the 1990s has been the need 
to enhance firm level competitiveness by 
increasing numerical and functional flexibility. 
An alternative explanation is that it is not a shift 
in constraints that we are seeing but rather a 
reassertion of the employer control (Frankel, 
1999). In China, the state has always been at the 
helm of affairs, there is a lot of privatization but 
it is more of control rather than of ownership. As 
we have seen there are direct and indirect 
pressures the state can put on the firms. 
Flexibility in China is just a method of making 
the firms realize that they have to be financially 
viable units or they will cease to exist, and to 
achieve this, have been given some autonomy in 
decision making at the firm level. In Korea, the 
state-employer partnership still exists. The 
Korean state is still strong but it would seem that 
in the recent years the state is losing some 
control over the workers, as in some recent 
situations where the workers were able to 
pressurize certain reforms and changes. In 
Korea, policymakers’ attempts to balance 
employer and worker interests in the face of 
globalization faced major obstacles and attracted 
widespread condemnation (Frankel, 1999). Still 
state has been and is facilitating smooth working 
of the industrial relations in the favor of the 
chaebols. The chaebol system has existed since 
1945 and even with a lot of changes has a lot of 
importance and power. In India the situation is a 
little different the employers did not have total 
control before economic liberalization, but now 
under the competitive environment the employer 
is gaining more control in the name of 
flexibility. To sum up we can say that flexibility 
in the three cases that we have seen is translated 
in the employer having more control over the 
workers and unions. 
Sixth, in all the three countries discussed, 
there are weak and fragmented union 
movements. In China, the union movement as 
such does not exist, there have been a lot of 
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strikes over the last couple of decades but those 
were reactions to bad conditions and low wages. 
Labor unions are not considered in the Chinese 
party vocabulary as an important factor in 
industrial relations. The party considers-in good 
times- the unions as training facilities for the 
workers and in bad times there is outright 
prohibition. In India, the situation is a little 
different, unions have existed before 
independence, and many union leaders were also 
fighting the British for independence. After 
independence these leaders became important 
figures in the Indian politics. Therefore, unions 
had the support of the political parties, they were 
financially independent and had the legal system 
behind them. Even with all of these factors in 
their favor the Indian unions were fragmented 
and got more fragmented under the pressures of 
globalization and competition.  Korean 
independent labor movement though started in 
the 1970s got recognition by the state in the late 
1990s with the acceptance of KCTU as 
independent union federation by the state. The 
labor movement is still at an embryonic stage 
trying to define itself and trying to find its 
proper niche in the Korean industrial relations. It 
is faced with the daunting task of employer 
movement towards more suppressive measures, 
the increasing number of irregular workers and 
global and domestic competition. Seventh, as 
discussed above the state still is an important 
player in the industrial relations of all three 
countries. The state as an important actor has 
mostly played a role to facilitate the employers. 
In promoting and reacting to globalization, 
governments in the three countries have 
sponsored legislation strengthening workplace 
managerial control and reducing workers’ job 
security, although political considerations have 
required that workers’ interests cannot be totally 
ignored(Frankel, 1999). 
From the above discussion it is clear that in 
the three cases under discussion there are a 
number of similarities, which strengthen the case 
for convergence. In most of the analytical work 
that I have come across on the three countries I 
have observed that as domestic forces 
industrialization and democratization often lead 
to development of unionism, tripartism and joint 
regulations. On the other hand globalization and 
economic liberalization, as international forces 
tend to have an opposite effect. They lead to 
employer and state resistance to unions, 
flexibility, employer control, job insecurity and 
worker redundancy. In the interaction between 
the two forces it is reasonable to assume that 
there is a tussle between the domestic forces and 
international forces. These domestic forces 
include a lot of factors including political 
systems, economic policies, culture, history and 
influence of unions. Even in countries where 
state is all powerful, its strategies are influenced 
by the domestic considerations aimed at 
institutional legitimacy. The following 
discussion would now make the case for 
divergence in the industrial relations of the three 
countries studied. 
A CASE FOR DIVERGENCE 
While discussing the effects of globalization 
the analytical questions that are frequently 
discussed by academics include analysis of 
whether globalization is leading towards liberal 
economic policies as opposed to regulated. Is the 
collective bargaining system in the countries 
going towards decentralization or centralization? 
And lastly, the most important question as far as 
industrial relations are concerned is whether the 
systems are going towards functional or 
numerical flexibility as opposed to remaining 
rigid. 
As far as regulation v. deregulation is 
concerned, I believe that the Chinese system is 
still very much regulated, there are some 
changes and some autonomy at the enterprise 
level, but decision making is still a part of the 
major functions of the party structure. Economic 
policies are decided at the highest level as they 
have been since 1949. The liberal economic 
policy in China primarily means attracting 
foreign investment and providing foreign 
investors with the environment that would make 
them stay in China. In Korea, the business was 
already in the hands of private conglomerates, 
which is still the case; economic policy was a 
matter to be decided by the state for the most 
part, for the benefit of the chaebols. The system 
is more or less still the same except one change 
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that now the unions have started to assert 
themselves and some recent legislative changes 
now help them to organize. Due to worker 
pressure there have been attempts at tripartism. 
The Indian economy was regulated from the 
beginning, but now it has changed to liberal. So 
in the three countries China is at one extreme 
with India at the other and Korea is between the 
two. 
Coming to centralized or decentralized 
collective bargaining we can say that in China 
the concept of individual and collective 
consultation is new. The system, at the moment, 
is decentralized with emphasis on enterprise 
level contracts and individual contracts. In 
Korea collective bargaining has always been 
decentralized. In fact there is a recent trend 
towards industrial bargaining and tripartite 
agreements. India, even though it had strong 
individual unions, has always had a 
decentralized collective bargaining system and 
the bargaining structure has remained the same. 
There is however some industry wide bargaining 
like in the banking sector in India. Unlike the 
industrialized countries in the west flexibility in 
the three countries discussed does not mean 
decentralization as there was no centralized 
bargaining to start with. In fact as seen in the 
Korean case there is some evidence of 
centralization. 
Coming to the most important question of 
workplace flexibility, it can be observed that the 
general movement is towards greater flexibility 
in all three countries. But owing to differences in 
the structures and systems of the countries, 
different forms of flexibility dominates in all 
three. In India, the movement is towards 
numerical flexibility. For this purpose retirement 
schemes and ‘Greenfield’ strategies are 
dominant. There is also union avoidance and 
increase in suppressive policies in the country. 
China is experiencing increased external labor 
market flexibility and at the firm level has been 
witnessing increase in both functional and 
numerical flexibility ever since deregulation of 
the economy(Kuruvilla, 2002). In Korea also, 
there is trend towards both types of flexibility. 
The biggest effect of strategy for numerical 
flexibility is that more than 50% of the total 
work force is now composed of irregular 
workers. On the other hand, the Korean 
government had in the past and still is spending 
money to educate its workers and increase their 
skill level.  
The difference is not only in the form of 
flexibility but also in the level of flexibility. In 
India, we have the strongest movement towards 
workplace flexibility at the workplace level. Not 
only that, HR practices is now considered to be 
an important element to enhance flexibility and 
prepare businesses to be able to face global 
competition. In China, as we have already seen, 
the flexibility and autonomy that the state has 
given the SOEs and the newly privatized SOEs 
is primarily aimed at the strategy that the state 
will not now give financial support to the 
enterprises. In other words the enterprises will 
have to be viable economic units in order to 
survive. This aim is achieved by giving some 
autonomy to the managers, but the overall 
control is in the hands of the state. The situation 
in the foreign investment companies is different; 
the state leaves such enterprises with complete 
autonomy, so as not to scare foreign capital off. 
In Korean industrial relations the trend towards 
greater flexibility is dominant like India. They 
have reverted from the Japanese style 
paternalistic system to HR practices. One 
difference between India and Korea is that in 
Korea the attempts to achieve flexibility by the 
employers have met stiffer resistance from the 
workers.  
The increased impetus for flexibility has 
different reasons for different countries. In India, 
when the planned and protectionist system came 
to an end with the liberalization policy, the 
employers for the first time faced global 
competition and realized that their rigid 
workplace practices were not adequate to deal 
with this situation. Therefore, they campaigned 
for more flexibility. In China too, the process of 
liberalization of the economy in order to 
integrate it to the world economic system was 
the primary reason for the demand for 
flexibility. In Korea however, the process of 
democratization increased the militancy in the 
labor movement and this eroded Korean 
competitive advantage in large industries leading 
to the demands of greater flexibility. 
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What influences the choices for different 
types of flexibilities? Kuruvilla and Erickson 
(2002) have come up with four factors that 
affect decision making regarding flexibility: 
First, they believe that in states where there was 
greater emphasis on job security in the past; 
there is greater level of numerical flexibility. 
They also believe that this tendency was evident 
even if the ability to layoff and retrench 
employees was difficult. In this regard they gave 
the Indian example, where the employers would 
find very difficult to lay off employees, 
therefore the employers came up with voluntary 
retirement schemes.  
The second influencing factor is the source 
of competitive advantage of the country in 
question. Kuruvilla and Erickson believe that 
numerical flexibility strategies tend to dominate 
in countries where the source of competitive 
advantage is low labor costs, as is the case of 
Indian industrial relations. There will also be 
numerical flexibility in industries that are labor 
intensive. In firms and nations that seek to 
capitalize on low costs, there is little incentive to 
invest in long-term training and continuous 
upskilling, associated with functional flexibility 
(Kuruvilla, 2002). The third factor associated 
with the choice of flexibility is the existence of 
governance institutions that encourage long-term 
investments in technology, research and 
development, and HR development (Kuruvilla, 
2002). In Korea for example the education 
system has been reformed by the state, there are 
also incentives for training and upskilling via tax 
incentives. In addition the Korean government 
has funded massive infrastructure projects for 
training necessary for competing in the global 
economy.  
Unions, is the fourth factor, it also plays an 
important role in the decision regarding the form 
and level of flexibility. Kuruvilla, Das, Kwon 
and Kwon (2002) have assessed decline of the 
union growth in Asia. For their analysis they had 
taken the variables of union density, and union 
influence-bargaining centralization and 
coverage. After an exhaustive study of seven 
Asian countries including China, India and 
Korea, they have come to the conclusion that 
over all there is a decline in union density 
figures in Asia. The data also suggest that , 
while Asian labor movements, on average, do 
not lag behind their Western European or North 
American counterparts in terms of union density, 
they certainly do so in terms of union influence 
(Das, 2002). In terms of influence they see two 
trends in Asia: one pattern where union 
influence corresponds somewhat to union 
density-like in the case of Korea and India- and 
a second pattern where union density differs 
dramatically from union influence score-China 
where the union density is 61% while coverage 
is 15%- (Das, 2002). Although, from the above 
analysis the influence of the unions can be 
termed as weak, but it is reasonable to expect 
that strong unions will push firms and countries 
in the direction of functional flexibility 
strategies Kuruvilla, 2002). It is true that 
stronger unions in Korea have affected and 
continue to influence, the ability of Korean 
Chaebol to adopt numerical flexibility strategies 
despite the obvious need of chaebols to cut labor 
cost. 
I believe that to the above four factors given 
by Kuruvilla and Erickson three more can be 
added: First, is the exposure of not only the 
individual countries to globalization but also the 
exposure of different sectors of the industry in 
the same country. In India, there is a clear 
distinction between sectors facing competition 
due to globalization and sectors that are not, for 
example, in computer software industry there is 
immense international and domestic 
competition, therefore there is a much stronger 
trend towards flexibility and the state is also 
supporting these workplace practices. On the 
other hand agriculture sector that is not exposed 
to globalization still gets protection, and 
subsidies. Korea is the only country of the three 
discussed whose industry is actually going out 
of the country to low cost countries. Second, is 
the role played by the state. We have seen that 
the state plays a pervasive role in all three 
countries, but still there are levels of control. 
The state power can also overshadow the 
influence of the unions, for example, in Korea 
there has been greater resistance to the demands 
of flexibility by the unions than China, but the 
level of flexibility achieved in both the states 
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differs. It is higher in Korea, because the unions 
are militant but the state-chaebol coalition is 
stronger. On the other hand in China, the unions 
are controlled by the state but still the trend 
towards flexibility is weaker than Korea because 
the state wants to bring in gradual changes and 
wants to remain in control of the change process. 
The third factor is the influence of 
international bodies like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and some transnational 
companies (TNCs). The process of assimilation 
to the global standards is not an automatic one. 
It is not just the market forces that are bringing 
the changes towards convergence of industrial 
relations, but there are also pressures from the 
world organizations and TNCs towards liberal 
economy and free trade. At the center of WTO 
are giant corporations wishing to extend their 
power. This power is already enormous. It is 
shocking to learn that 52 of the world’s 100 
largest financial bodies are not countries but 
transnational corporations (Shepherd, 1999). On 
the other hand there is the IMF. We have seen in 
the Korean example that when the IMF helped 
Korea out of economic troubles in 1997 the 
restructuring program led to quick recovery but 
it also increased unemployment, working hours 
and reduced the social net. In countries where 
the pressure of these international entities is 
great, the likelihood of opting for deregulation, 
decentralization and flexibility would increase. 
CONCLUSION 
Globalization is here to stay, it would be 
ridiculous on the part of the nations of the world 
to close their eyes to it and wish it away. Any 
country that wants to be on the economic map of 
the world would have to enter this competitive 
environment. In order to face the competition 
flexibility is imperative; therefore we see in the 
three countries that there is a trend towards 
flexibility. But we have also seen that the needs, 
types and levels of flexibility in different 
countries is different based on the factors 
discussed. There is no doubt that in the short run 
there is convergence towards workplace 
flexibility owing to the pressures of international 
competition, but in the long run in the three 
countries that we have discussed the future of 
flexibility will depend on the interaction of the 
key players in their respective industrial relation 
systems. 
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